of senators most closely track the policy preferences of their individual donors, rather than those of voters in the state or even co-partisans in the stateand that this pushes senators to the ideological poles. Fortin M, Bravo G, Hudon C, Vanasse A, Lapointe. But little in academic work on democracy, or even popular accounts of democracy, even addresses issues related to negotiation, such as the institutional environments or structural conditions that enable effective negotiations among political leaders. When the audience for a negotiation is public, the parties are encouraged to posture for their own constituents and, sometimes, to stand for principle by refusing to compromise. This approach is a longstanding one. Primary Health CareNow More Than Ever. In a world in which the potential pool of money to influence election outcomes becomes effectively unlimited, because Buckley. Other studies do not reach such conclusions, and it is too early with these systems to draw conclusions about whether individual donor-based public financing systems will contribute to polarization. If similar PACs closely tied to the leadership emerge on both sides of the aisle in both houses of Congress, party leaders might well end up with greater leverage over rank-and-file members dependent on this source of funding. At the same time that these channels enable individual officeholders to reach out, they also enable more widespread populist influence to reach in and factional interests within parties can be more easily mobilized.
Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law
American Journal of Political Science.
In another article on election administration and federalism in th is issue.
The federal government remains factionalized and fragmented.
To the long-run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States.
My final, more extreme proposal therefore takes to its natural conclusion the underlying idea of structuring the campaign finance system to support a larger role for the political parties, in a way that addresses this corruption concern. In the past, for example, I have supported matching private-public election financing systems, such as the system used in New York City and now being adopted elsewhere. Yet term limits seem not to have any effect on the composition of those elected to office. The idea is part of a recurring wish or vision throughout American political history. Open negotiations can themselves foster polarization, which is why peace negotiations are frequently carried out in secret. All this runs counter to the DNA of Americas democratic sensibilities. Electoral incentives and the desire to wield the tools of political power provide powerful motivations to compromise between groups in the pursuit of winning coalitions. Other social scientists suggest that the public is even more extreme in its policy views than those in office or, at the least, that those whose views are categorized as moderate are actually ideologically polarized too. Fixes for polarization can be categorized into two forms. The government shutdown and near financial default were not a simple product of party polarization; they reflected the inability of party leaders to bring along recalcitrant minority factions of their parties and individual members to make the deals that party leaders believed necessary. But two major changes have made committee assignments less meaningful when it comes to the ability to raise funds and enhance ones public status and visibility, at least for those politicians who see themselves as upwardly mobile (that is, most of them the communications revolution. Before that moment, the political parties raised nearly half their money in what was called soft money.
Fragmented Federalism: The State of American Federalism 2012
The Problem of Fragmentation and the Need for Integrative Solutions
Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline
Is local government fragmentation good or bad for cities?